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Abstract
TenantGuard: Scalable Runtime Veriﬁcation of Cloud-Wide VM-Level Network Isolation
Yu Shun Wang
The multi-tenancy of a cloud usually leads to security concerns over network isolation around
each cloud tenant’s virtual resources. However, verifying network isolation in cloud virtual net-
works poses several unique challenges. The sheer size of virtual networks implies a prohibitive
complexity, whereas the constant changes in virtual resources demand a short response time. To
make things worse, such networks typically allow ﬁne-grained (e.g., VM-level) and distributed (e.g.,
security groups) network access control. Those challenges can either invalidate existing approaches
or cause an unacceptable delay which prevents runtime applications. In this thesis, we present Ten-
antGuard, a scalable system for verifying cloud-wide, VM-level network isolation at runtime. We
take advantage of the hierarchical nature of virtual networks, efﬁcient data structures, incremental
veriﬁcation, and parallel computation to reduce the performance overhead of security veriﬁcation.
We implement our approach based on OpenStack and evaluate its performance both in-house and on
Amazon EC2, which conﬁrms its scalability and efﬁciency (13 seconds for verifying 168 millions
of VM pairs). We further integrate TenantGuard with Congress, an OpenStack policy service, to
verify the compliance of isolation results against tenant-speciﬁc high level security policies.
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The widespread adoption of cloud is still being hindered by security and privacy concerns, es-
pecially the lack of transparency, accountability, and auditability [1]. Particularly, in a multi-tenant
cloud environment, virtualization allows sharing physical resources, such as computing and net-
working services, among multiple tenants in an optimal and cost-effective way. On the other hand,
multi-tenancy is also a double-edged sword that often leads cloud tenants to raise questions like:
“Are my virtual machines (VMs) properly isolated from other tenants, especially my competitors?”
In fact, network isolation is among the foremost security concerns for most cloud tenants, and cloud
providers often have an obligation to provide clear evidences for sufﬁcient network isolation, either
as part of the service level agreements, or to demonstrate compliance with security standards (e.g.,
ISO 27002/27017 [2, 3] and CCM 3.0.1 [4]).
Verifying network isolation potentially requires checking that all the VMs are either reachable
or isolated from each other exactly as speciﬁed in cloud tenants’ security policies. In contrast to
traditional networks, virtual networks, which are at the heart of communications inside a cloud
environment, pose unique challenges to the veriﬁcation of network isolation as follows.
- First, the sheer size of virtual networks inside a cloud implies a prohibitive complexity. For
example, a decent-size cloud is said to have around 1,000 tenants and 100,000 users, with 17
percent of users having more than 1,000 VMs [5, 6]. Performing a cloud-wide veriﬁcation
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of network isolation at the VM-level for such a cloud could potentially involve billions of
VM pairs. Most existing techniques in physical networks are not designed for such a scale,
and will naturally suffer from scalability issues (a detailed review of related work is given in
Chapter 2).
- Second, the self-service nature of a cloud means virtual resources in a cloud (e.g., VMs and
virtual routers or ﬁrewalls) can be added, deleted, or migrated at any time by cloud tenants
themselves. Consequently, tenants may want to verify the network isolation repetitively or
periodically at runtime, instead of performing it only once and ofﬂine. Moreover, since any
veriﬁcation result will likely have a much shorter lifespan under such a constantly changing
environment, tenants would naturally expect the results to be returned in seconds, instead of
minutes or hours demanded by existing approaches [7].
- Third, a unique feature of virtual networks, quite unlike that in traditional networks, is the
ﬁne-grained and distributed nature of network access control mechanisms. For example, in-
stead of only determined by a few physical routers and ﬁrewalls, the fate of a packet travers-
ing virtual networks will also depend on the forwarding and ﬁltering rules of all the virtual
routers, distributed ﬁrewalls (e.g., security groups in OpenStack [8]), and network address
translation (NAT), which are commonly deployed in a very ﬁne-grained manner, such as on
individual VMs. Unfortunately, most existing works fail to reach such a granularity since
they are mostly designed for (physical) network-level veriﬁcation (i.e., between IP preﬁxes)
instead of VM-level veriﬁcation with distributed ﬁrewalls.
Figure 1.1 shows the simpliﬁed view of a multi-tenant cloud environment1. The solid line boxes
depict the physical machines (N compute nodes and one network node) inside which are the VMs,
distributed ﬁrewalls (security groups), and virtual routers or switches. The virtual resources of
different tenants (e.g., VM A1 of Alice, and VM B2 of Bob) are depicted by different ﬁlling patterns.
- The network isolation may be compromised through either unintentional misconﬁgurations
1To make our discussions more concrete, the examples will mostly be based on OpenStack, and Chapter 7 discusses






































Figure 1.1: An Example of a Multi-Tenant Cloud
or malicious attacks exploiting implementation ﬂaws. For example, assume the current se-
curity policies of tenants Alice and Bob allow their VMs VM A1 and VM B2 to be reachable
from each other, as reﬂected by the two security group rules allow src 1.10.1.12
and allow src 1.10.0.75. Now suppose Alice would like to stop accesses to her VM
VM A1, and therefore she deletes the rule allow src 1.10.1.12 and updates her high
level deﬁned security policy accordingly. However, Alice is not aware of an OpenStack vul-
nerability OSSA 2015-021 [9], which causes such a security group change to silently fail to
be applied to the already running VM VM A1. At the same time, a malicious user of tenant
Bob exploits another vulnerability OSSA 2014-008 [10] by which OpenStack (Neutron) fails
to perform proper authorization checks, allowing the user to create a port on Alice’s virtual
router R A3 and subsequently bridges that port to his/her own router R B1. Consequently,
Alice’s VM VM A1 will remain to be accessible by Bob, which is a breach of network isola-
tion.
- To timely detect such a breach of network isolation, the challenge Alice faces is again three-
fold. First, assume the cloud has 25, 000 VMs among which Alice owns 2, 000. Since all
those VMs may potentially be the source of a breach, and each VM may have both a private
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IP and dynamically allocated public IP, Alice potentially has to verify the isolation between
25, 000 × 2, 000 × 2 = 100 millions of VM pairs. Second, despite such a high complexity,
Alice wants to schedule the veriﬁcation to be performed every ﬁve minutes and is expecting
to see the results within a few seconds, since she knows the result may only be valid until the
next change is made to the virtual networks (e.g., adding a port by Bob). Finally, to perform
the veriﬁcation, Alice must collect information from heterogeneous data sources scattered at
different locations (e.g., routing and NAT rules in virtual routers, host routes of subnets, and
ﬁrewall rules implementing tenant security groups).
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we present TenantGuard, a scalable system for verifying cloud-wide, VM-level
network isolation at runtime, while taking into consideration the unique features of virtual networks,
such as distributed ﬁrewalls. To address the aforementioned challenges, our main ideas are as
follows. First, TenantGuard takes advantage of the hierarchical structure found in most virtual
networks (e.g., OpenStack includes several abstraction layers organized in a hierarchical manner,
including VM ports, subnets, router interfaces, routers, router gateways, and external networks) to
reduce the performance overhead of veriﬁcation. Second, TenantGuard adopts a top-down approach
by ﬁrst performing the veriﬁcation at the (private and public) IP preﬁx level, and then propagating
the partial veriﬁcation results down to the VM-level through efﬁcient data structures with constant
search time, such as radix trees [11] and X-fast binary tries [12]. Finally, TenantGuard leverages
existing cloud policy services to check isolation results against tenant-speciﬁc high level security
policies. The following summarizes our main contributions.
- To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst system that can verify cloud-wide, VM-level
network isolation with a practical delay for runtime applications (13 seconds for verifying
25, 246 VMs and 168 millions of VM pairs, as detailed in Chapter 6).
- We devise a hierarchical model for virtual networks along with a packet forwarding and ﬁl-
tering function to capture various components of a virtual network (e.g., security groups,
subnets, and virtual routers) and their relationships.
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- We design algorithms that leverage efﬁcient data structures, incremental veriﬁcation, and an
open source parallel computation platform to reduce the veriﬁcation delay.
- We implement and integrate our approach into OpenStack [8], a widely deployed open source
cloud management system. We evaluate the scalability and efﬁciency of our approach by
conducting experiments both in-house and on Amazon EC2.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related work. Chap-
ter 3 describes our threat model and virtual network model. Chapter 4 discusses our system design.
Chapter 5 provides the details of TenantGuards integration into OpenStack. Chapter 6 gives exper-
imental results. Chapter 7 discusses the adaptability and integrity preserving. Chapter 8 provides




Network veriﬁcation works can be divided into two categories by their research objects, net-
works in non-cloud and cloud environments. In this chapter, we discuss them separately in section
2.1 and 2.2. Additionally, in section 2.3, we compare them with TenantGuard in terms of offered
features and performance.
2.1 Non-Cloud Networks Verification
In the context of non-cloud networks, several works (e.g., [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]) propose net-
work veriﬁcation approaches on conventional networks, while others propose works on SDN (e.g.,
[18, 19, 20]). In their pioneering work, Xie et al. [13] propose an automated static reachability
analysis of physical IP networks based on a graph-based model. Hassel[16] detects violations of
network invariants such as absence of forwarding loops using geometric header space model, while
Anteater [14] and ConﬁgChecker [15], offer similar features by representing forwarding rules as
logical predicates which are able to be veriﬁed by model checkers. Although those works are suc-
cessful for verifying enterprise and campus networks, they cannot address challenges of large scale
cloud-based virtual networks, especially verifying network properties on VM-level granularity. For
instance, Hassel [16] needs 151 seconds to compress forwarding tables before spending an addi-
tional 560 seconds in verifying loop-absence for a topology with 26 nodes. On the other hand,
AP Veriﬁer [17] improves the performance by extracting sets of predicates from relatively larger
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amount of forwarding rules, however, it works as query-based network invariants veriﬁcation be-
tween a speciﬁc pair of source and destination nodes. In order to cover all-pairs, the total number
of queries would grow signiﬁcantly. This hinders the scalability to tackle virtual networks in large
scale clouds. Furthermore, most of these works consider routers/switches as the source and desti-
nation nodes for their veriﬁcation, while we target VMs pairs which have much larger amount.
Other works (e.g., [18, 19, 20]) propose approaches for SDN networks, where larger amount of
nodes are targeted. VeriFlow [18] and NetPlumber [19] (extension of Hassel [16]) outperform pre-
vious works by proposing a near real-time veriﬁcation based on incremental method, where network
events are monitored for conﬁguration changes, and veriﬁcation is performed only on the impacted
part of the network. On the other hand, Libra [20] uses a divide and conquer technique to verify
forwarding tables in large networks for subnet-level reachability failures, and enhance their perfor-
mance leveraging map-reduce parallelization. Although incremental and parallel methods are ap-
plied to address larger scale of nodes, all of them are designed for centrally managed SDN, which is
different from autonomously governed virtual networks among public clouds. Hence, some existing
limitations might prevent these works from being directly applied to virtual networks veriﬁcation in
clouds. For example, as mentioned in their discussion [18], VeriFlow has difﬁculty to address NAT
inside end-to-end path(which is prevalent in public clouds) due to they rely on equivalent classes
model obtained from preﬁxes, while the scalability of NetPlumer [19] is limited by their Linear
Fragment assumption on forwarding rules, which may be hold by centralized network management
policies and deployments, but may not in multi-tenant clouds as each tenant may have different
networking background, knowledge and management style. As for Libra [20], their divide-conquer
scheme is based on their assumption that preﬁxes used in forwarding rules cannot be more speciﬁc
than CIDR of subnet, which only can be guaranteed by speciﬁc deployments, since forwarding rules
violating such assumption are legitimate in ordinary routers. Even so it is prone to violations caused
by unintentionally made rules. Therefore, their technique will face severe challenges in the context
of autonomous governed virtual networks in public clouds, where such requirement is hard to be
enforced by all tenants.
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2.2 Cloud-Based Network Verification
In the context of cloud-based network veriﬁcation, there are several works (e.g., [21, 7]) aim to
design general security property veriﬁcation engines over physical networks in data centers owned
by cloud providers, where virtual networks created by tenants (which is our main research object),
are not take into account. However, NoD [21] and its successor [7] provide all-pair VM reacha-
bility feature over large-scale physical networks that can be compared with our work in terms of
performance. We consider these works as complementary to our approach as they tackle the phys-
ical network veriﬁcation in large cloud data centers from cloud providers view, while our effort is
focused on tenant’s virtual networks that are built on top of these physical networks and can be at
the origin of several security issues due to their high dynamism and versatility.
On the other hands, several works (e.g., [22, 23, 24]) address security property veriﬁcation
over virtulization infrastructures. Bleikertz et al. [23] propose CloudRadar, a static information
ﬂow analysis system dedicated on VMware platform, where only a few layer-2 virtualized network
elements such as vswitch and vlan are discussed, while higher level virtual network elements for
packet forwarding and ﬁltering such as virtual router and ﬁrewalls are absent. Bleikertz et al.[22]
and Probst et al. [24] propose veriﬁcation on ﬁltering rules in security group and ﬁrewall’s network
access control respectively, but none of them can verify VM reachability due to the lack of capturing
and analyzing packet forwarding rules through virtual routers inside multi-tenant clouds.
Congress [25] is an open project for OpenStack platforms. It enforces policies expressed by
tenants and then monitors the state of the cloud to check its compliance. However, reachability re-
quires recursive Datalog queries, which are difﬁcult to solve and are not supported by Congress [25].
Therefore, we integrated TenantGuard into Congress in order to check network isolation results
provided by TenantGuard against tenants’ security policies deﬁned in Congress. Additionally, by
integrating TenantGuard to Congress, we augmented Congress capabilities to support reachability-
related policies as NoD without modifying Datalog-based policy language provided by Congress.
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Network Proposals Methods Features
Physical vs
Virtual net.





Hassel [16] Custom • • • •
NetPlumber [19] Graph • • • • • • •
Anteater [14] SAT solver • • • • •
Veriﬂow [18] Graph • • • •
AP veriﬁer [17] Custom • • • • •
Libra [20] Graph • • • • • •
Cloud
NoD [21] SMT Solver • • • • •
Nod with symmetry and surgery [7] SMT Solver • • • • •
CloudRadar [23] Graph • •
[24] Graph • •
TenantGuard Graph • • • • • • •
Table 2.1: Comparison of Features Offered by Existing Solutions
The symbol (•) indicates that the proposal offers the corresponding feature
2.3 Comparison with TenantGuard
Table 2.1 summarizes the qualitative comparison between existing works on network reachabil-
ity veriﬁcation and TenantGuard. The ﬁrst column divides existing works into two categories based
on the targeted environments, i.e., either cloud-based networks or non-cloud networks. The second
and third columns list existing works and indicate their veriﬁcation methods. The next column com-
pares those works to TenantGuard on various features, e.g., the support of parallel implementation,
incremental veriﬁcation, NAT, and all pairs reachability veriﬁcation (which is the main target of
TenantGuard), detection of forwarding loops and black holes. The last column compares the scope
of those works, i.e., whether each work is designed for physical or virtual networks.
Network Proposals Size of input Verif.TimeVMs Routers Rules
Non-
Cloud
Hassel [16] - 26 756.5k -
NetPlumber [19] - 52 143k 60
Anteater [14] - 178 1,627 -
Veriﬂow [18] - 172 5millions -
AP veriﬁer [17] - 58 3,605 -
Libra [20] - 11,260 2,650k -
Cloud
NoD [21] 100,000 - 820k 471,600
NoD with symmetry and surgery [7] 100,000 - 820k 7,200
CloudRadar [23] 30,000 - - -
[24] 23 - - -
TenantGuard 100k 1,200 850k 1,056
Table 2.2: Comparison of Existing Solutions Performance
All veriﬁcation time measurements are reported in seconds.
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On the other hand, in table 2.2, quantitative comparison is given in terms of input size and
veriﬁcation time among these works. With regard to input size, for works on cloud environment,
number of VMs, routers (or switches), forwarding and ﬁltering rules are listed, while for those
non-cloud works, the latter two are indicated. As for the veriﬁcation time, only results on all-pair
reachability are reported. Note all these results come from tests under single-machine environment,
although our work has implemented parallelization and shown signiﬁcant speedup. We report our
parallel test results in chapter 6.
From the table 2.1, we can see among the works dealing with virtual networks of clouds, our
work is the only one addressing all-pair reachability, as well as loop and black hole detection with
parallelization. Comparing to the works on physical networks with all-pair reachability feature, as




In this chapter, we describe the threat model and propose our hierarchical graph model for cloud
virtual networks.
3.1 Threat Model
We assume the cloud infrastructure management system may have implementation ﬂaws or
vulnerabilities that can potentially be exploited by a malicious cloud tenant or its users to violate
the other tenants’ network isolation polices. We assume the cloud provider and its infrastructure
management system will ensure the integrity of its conﬁguration data stored in databases and logs
collected through API calls, event notiﬁcations, or database queries. Speciﬁcally, to ensure the
integrity of information and event notiﬁcations collected from OpenStack, we can rely on existing
techniques such as hardware-based platforms that ensure data secrecy and code integrity based
on TPM (e.g, [26, 27]), and software-based tampering detection solutions (e.g., [28]). Also, we
assume the vulnerabilities existing in OpenStack do not affect the integrity of collected data, logs
and events notiﬁcations. Further discussion on existing methods to preserve integrity of the database
and logs will be given in chapter 7. We assume each cloud tenant would provide security policies on
network isolation to indicate which virtual resources should be accessible and by whom. Although
our solution can catch a breach of such security policies (e.g., Bob can still access Alice’s VM
after Alice has tried to prevent it, as demonstrated in Chapter 1), the focus is not on detecting
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speciﬁc attacks or vulnerabilites (correlating our results with other security mechanisms, such as
IDSs or vulnerability scanners, is an interesting future direction). We focus on the virtual network
layer (layer 3) in this thesis, and our work is complementary to existing solutions at other layers
(e.g., veriﬁcation in physical networks or isolation with regard to covert channels caused by co-
residency; more details are given in chapter 2). Finally, we assume the veriﬁcation results (e.g.,
which VMs may connect to a tenant) do not disclose sensitive information about other tenants and
regard potential privacy issues as a future work.
3.2 Virtual Network Model
To facilitate further discussions, we ﬁrst deﬁne a hierarchical graph model to capture various




















IP: 1.10.0.2 IP: 1.10.0.3
Tenant Alice Tenant Bob




























Figure 3.1: An Example of the Virtual Network Model
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Example 1 Figure 3.1 illustrates an instance of our model that captures the virtual networks of
tenants Alice and Bob, following our example shown in Figure 1.1.
- Each tenant can create virtual subnets(e.g., SN A1 and SN A2 of Alice). A subnet (e.g.,
SN A2) is collection of IP addresses represented as a CIDR (e.g., 10.0.0.0/24). Usually
a default gateway is assigned (e.g., router interface IF A11) to indicate by default where
the packet sent from ports within this subnet should be forwarded to. In addition, tenant may
specify a set of forwarding rules (host routes) to a subnet if it is connected to multiple routers
and provide other options besides default gateway.
- A newly created VM (e.g., VM A1 in figure 1.1) will be attached to a virtual port (e.g., VP A1
in figure 3.1) on a subnet (e.g., SN A2) and associated with a private IP (e.g., 10.0.0.12).
- Ingress and egress security groups are associated with the virtual ports attached to VMs and
act as virtual firewalls.
- Virtual routers (e.g., R A1) interconnect different subnets by router interfaces to route intra-
tenant traffic(e.g., between SN A2 and SN A3) and inter-tenant traffic, and direct them to
external networks (e.g., ExtNet 1) via router gateways (e.g., RG A1).
- Several interconnected external networks (only one in the figure 3.1) may exist, where each
(e.g., ExtNet 1) can have a routable public IP address block(e.g., 1.10.0.0/22).
- For inter-tenant traffic, at least one router from each tenant must be involved and the traf-
fic generally traverses external networks. For any communication going through external
networks, public IP addresses allocated to VM (e.g., VP A1.Public IP=1.10.0.75)
should be used during the traversal.
- The mapping of private and public IP addresses are maintained by NAT rules located at
virtual routers with a router gateway, where inbound traffic are filtered in such a way that
packets are allowed only if their destination IPs match existing public addresses in NAT rules.
More generally, Figure 3.1 may be abstracted as an undirected graph with typed nodes, as de-
ﬁned in the following.
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Vertex Type vm port subnet v router v router if v router gw ext net
vm port - * - - - -
subnet * - - * - -
v router - - - * * -
v router if - * * - - -
v router gw - - * - - *
ext net - - - - * *
Table 3.1: Edges Between Vertex Type Pairs In Virtual Network Model
’*’ represents existence of edges between vertex type pairs, while ’-’ means an absence of edges
Definition 1 A virtual network model is an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where V is a set of typed nodes each of which is associated with a set of at-
tributes s = {id, tenant id, Public IP, Private IP, type, rules}, while type ∈
{vm port, subnet, v router, v router if, v router gw, ext net}, representing VM port, subnet,
router, router interface, router gateway, and external network, respectively. E is a set of undirected
edge representing the logical connectivity among those network components.
Table 3.1 shows the matrix of edge existence among vertex type pairs, meanwhile table 3.2
demonstrates relationships between vertices reﬂected by these edges. The underlying logic follows
how these virtual network components are created, as discussed in example 1. Consequently, this
graph model is capable of reﬂecting network ﬂows in virtual networks. For instance, as shown
in table 3.1 and 3.2, since vertex representing a subnet is incident on edges joining all adjacent
VM ports associated with the same subnet ID, for any pair of these ports there exists one path
that passes the subnet vertex, which implies that trafﬁc between these ports can be delivered at
layer 2 level (subnets) without any help from devices working on layer 3 such as routers. On the
contrary, trafﬁc between ports located in different subnets will go through virtual routers if these
subnet vertices are adjacent to the corresponding router interfaces. Note that table 3.1 shows edges
exists between external network vertices. Further, these edges exist for any pair of distinct external
network vertex, as shown in table 3.2. The reason behind this is that external networks consist of
public accessible IP addresses, so any pair of them are considered to be reachable, which can be
simply represented via these edges. As mentioned in section 2.2, works such as NoD [21] addressed
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Edge Relationship Description
subnet-vm port One-to-Many VM ports have identical subnet ID
subnet-v router if One-to-Many Router interfaces have identical subnet ID
v router-v router if One-to-Many Router interfaces have identical router ID
v router-v router gw One-to-One Router gateway belongs to the router
ext net-v router gw One-to-Many Router gateways have identical external network ID
ext net-ext net Many-to-Many Any pair of distinct external network vertex has an edge
Table 3.2: Vertex Relationship Represented by Edges
Vertex Type VM Port Router Interface Router Gateway
Degree 1 2 2
Table 3.3: Vertex Degree In Virtual Network Graph
reachability between physical networks in data centers of cloud provider, which can be abstracted as
aforementioned external networks and their edges in our study. This is why we consider our work
to be the supplement of these previous works. As a result, the subgraph connecting all external
network vertices is a complete graph in our model. Additionally, G is a simple graph where there
is no loop in which one edge joins a vertex to itself.
From the table 3.1 and 3.2, we can see that some types of vertices have ﬁxed degrees in our
graph model, which are summarized in table 3.3. Each VM port only has one edge joining the
corresponding subnet, hence, its degree is 1 which implies these vertices are endpoints of the graph.
Further, Router interfaces and gateways are only incident on two edges, one joining the associated
routers, another linking subnet and external network respectively. Therefore, both of them have
degree 2.
Based on table 3.3, G can be decomposed into a set of maximally connected sub-graphs [29]
(denoted by Ci = (Vi, Ei) in later discussions) by removing all edges between router gateways
and external networks. Since router gateways always have degree of 2, with above removal, their
degrees will be reduced to 1, causing those subgraphs representing different tenants’ private virtual
networks, including VM ports, subnets, routers, its interfaces and gateways, are disconnected from
external networks. Imagine in ﬁgure 3.1, by such removal, Alice and Bob’s private virtual networks
is disconnected from each other, as well as from external networks.
With this graph model, we can have a topological view on virtual network components. To
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verify VM-level isolation, we need further analysis of forwarding and ﬁltering rules attached to
vertices in G, which is discussed in section 3.3.
3.3 Forwarding and Filtering Model
In the following, we ﬁrst model how packets may traverse a virtual network, and then formalize




























































Packet Transformation Caused by NAT
Figure 3.2: An Example of Forwarding, Filtering Rules and NAT
Forwarding and Filtering
Network packets traversing virtual networks are typically governed by both ﬁltering (security
group rules) and forwarding (routing) rules, as illustrated in example 2.
Example 2 Figure 3.2 shows a subgraph of the virtual network graph with associated rules which
are extracted from figure 3.1 along the dotted line, as well as network address translation (NAT)
occurred during the traversal from Alice’s VM A1 to Bob’s VM B2, a typical inter-tenant traffic,
where packet headers (only including source and destination IP) are listed in the upper table of
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figure 3.2. In this toy virtual network setup, the initial packet P0, which is described in figure 3.2, is
sent from VM A1 to VM B2.
- P0 is allowed by the egress security group attached to VM A1 , then forwarded to the subnet
node SN A2.
- For P0, the most specific forwarding rules in SN A2 will make the packet sent to IF A11
according to longest matching semantics. Through IF A11, P0 will be delivered to router
R A1.
- At R A1, P0 hits the NAT rule on its source IP. As the result, sNAT in the virtual router will
transform P0 to P1 by replacing the source IP of P0 from VM A1’s private IP to its public
IP 1.10.0.75. Sequentially, P1 is forwarded to RG A1 according to the forwarding rules in
R A1. Afterwards, it is sent to the external network EXT.NET.
- P1 traverses external networks to router gateway RG B1, and arrives at router R B1.
- Inside R B1, P1 hits the NAT rule on its destination IP. Therefore, dNAT rewrites it with
private IP of VM B2 19.0.0.30, denoted as P2, and the packet is allowed to pass through the
router to make it able to traverse Bob’s private virtual network.
- Similarly, P2 is forwarded to VP B2 and allowed by associated ingress security group rule.
Now VM B2 receives the packet sent by VM A1. Note with source IP in P2, VM B2 can send
responding packets to its peer reversely.
Example 2 shows how both forwarding and ﬁltering rules (security groups) with NAT dominate
packets traversals inside virtual network graph. More generally, the following models the way that
packets traverse virtual networks using a forwarding and ﬁltering function, which captures these
rules and NAT.
Definition 2 Forwarding and Filtering Function. Given a virtual network graph G = (V,E),
- let p ∈ P be a symbolic packet consisting of a set of header fields (e.g., source and destination
IPs) and their corresponding values in {0, 1}L such that L is the length of the field’s value,
and
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- let (p, (u, v)) be a forwarding state where (u,v) is the pair of nodes in G representing respec-
tively the predecessor node (i.e., the sender node) and the current node (i.e., the node v where
the packet is located in the current state).
- The forwarding and filtering function fdG returns the successor forwarding states {(p′i, (v,wi))}i∈N ,
such that each wi ∈ V is a receiving node according to the results of rules matching at node
v, and p′i is the symbolic packet resulting from a set of transformations (e.g., NAT) over packet
p before being forwarded to wi where {v,wi}∀i∈N ∈ E.
- A forwarding path for packet p from node u to node v is a sequence of forwarding states
(p, (null, u))· · · (p′, (v, null)).
As a convention, we will use null in forwarding states to denote a forwarding state where the
symbolic packet has been dropped (e.g., (null, (w,null))), a packet initially placed on a node v
(e.g., (p, (null, v))), or a packet received by w after the last hop (e.g., (p, (w,null))).
Network Isolation
With the virtual network graph model, forwarding and ﬁltering function just deﬁned, we can
formally model network isolation and related properties as follows.
Definition 3 Given a virtual network graph G = (V,E),
- for any u,v ∈ V , we say u and v are reachable if there exists a packet p ∈ P and a forwarding
path for p from u to v. Otherwise, we say u and v are isolated.
- A forwarding loop exists between u ∈ V and v ∈ V if there exists p ∈ P destined to v and
w,w′ ∈ V such that (p, (w,w′)) is a reachable forwarding state and that fdG((p, (w,w′))) =
(p, (w′, w)).
- A blackhole exists between u ∈ V and v ∈ V if there exists p ∈ P destined to v and
w,w′ ∈ V such that (p, (w,w′)) is a reachable forwarding state and fdG((p, (w,w′))) =
(null, (w′, null)).
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The properties given in Deﬁnition 3 can serve as the building blocks of any network isolation
policies speciﬁed by a cloud tenant. The speciﬁc forms in which such security policies are given
are not important, as long as such policies can unambiguously determine whether two nodes should
be reachable or isolated. Therefore, our main goal in verifying a tenant’s security policies regarding
network isolation is to ensure any two nodes are reachable (resp. isolated) if and only if this is
speciﬁed in such policies. In addition, our veriﬁcation algorithms introduced in Chapter 4 can also





In this chapter, based on models illustrated in chapter 3, we introduce our methodology on
VM-level network isolation veriﬁcation. First, we propose an VM-level baseline solution directly
applying the virtual network graph model and fdG derived from deﬁnition 2. Second, we analyze
preﬁx-level reachability and address challenges. Finally, we demonstrate TenantGuard, an three-
step veriﬁcation solution based on preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability, in details. Note that incremental
veriﬁcation is not discussed in this thesis.
4.1 Baseline Solution
As demonstrated in section 3.3, forwarding a packet from one VM to another can be abstracted
to a traversal through virtual network graph G. Given a VM port vertex u in G, a question that
which VMs can reach u could be generalized to ﬁnd the permutation of forwarding paths from
other endpoints representing VMs in G to u. Like other graph traversals, forwarding paths are edge
sequences in G. But the different point is how to choose an edge at vertices during traversals. For
example, algorithms for shortest path problem leverage weight of edges to make such decision.
As for virtual network graph traversal, edge selection depends on forwarding and ﬁltering rules
associated with vertices. If a matching rule is found, an edge is selected and the traversal continues.
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Otherwise, packet may be dropped. Hence the challenges of such traversals not only exist in the
scale of graph, but also amounts of rules in vertices.
Radix tree [11] is one of data structures that can be used to encode forwarding rules and query
routing results efﬁciently. IP preﬁxes which represent matching condition of rules are encoded into
binary bits as nodes in the tree, while routing results are stored in labeled variables of nodes. Given
a key such as a destination IP, querying the corresponding routing result can be achieved by binary
comparison in radix trees following longest matching principle.





















Figure 4.1: A Radix Tree with Encoded Forwarding Rules
Figure 4.1 shows a toy example of a radix tree with encoded forwarding rules in a virtual router.
Typically, these rules consist of destinations (IP preﬁx) and next hops, as shown in the table of
ﬁgure 4.1. An empty radix tree is initialized with a root node. When one rule say r0 in the ﬁgure is
encoded into the tree, to represent its ﬁrst bit 0, a new node is inserted, as well as a left link at the
root to connect the node. Similarly, to represent a bit 1 in a preﬁx, such as the ﬁrst bit of rule r3,
another node is inserted with a right link at its predecessor. As a result, for any rule, its destination
preﬁx is encoded into a chain of nodes, while the corresponding next hop is labeled as a variable
named NH at the end of this chain. In such a way, we can construct the radix tree encoding all four
rules as shown in the ﬁgure 4.1. Each destination and next hop can be considered as a key-value
pair. Within radix trees, keys are not directly stored, but represented by their locations.
To forward a packet in such a virtual router, the most speciﬁc forwarding rule should be found.
With radix trees, this can be done by a binary search starting from the root node, where bits in the
destination IP are used to be compared with the bits represented by nodes in the tree. For example,
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given a destination IP that its four most signiﬁcant bits of are 0010 as the key to query the radix tree
shown in ﬁgure 4.1, along the left branch from the root node, the process of binary comparison will
terminate at the third node, as there is not a right link for the third bit of 0010. Clearly, only one
matching rule r0 is found during the comparison. Hence, a packet with such destination IP should
be forwarded to IF A21.
Radix trees can also be applied to ﬁltering rules in security groups. These rules are key-value
pairs of destination and ﬁltering results (allowed or denied). We can encode these rules into radix
trees in a similar way, and store the ﬁltering results in different variables. To query the value for
a given key, a binary search is executed. Note that for ﬁltering rules, the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-serve
principle is applied. Hence, the binary search process will stop when the ﬁrst matching result is
found.
Algorithm 1 Baseline Veriﬁcation
1: Input: G = (V,E)
2: Output: VM-level Isolation Results
3: for each u, v ∈ V ∧ u = v do
4: P(u,v) = IPu × IPv
5: R = null
6: for each p ∈ P(u,v) do
7: s = (p, (null, u))
8: S.append(s)
9: while s = (¬null, (v, null)) do
10: s = fdG(s)












23: if ∃forwardingpath ∈ R then
24: result = reachable
25: else
26: result = isolated
27: end if
28: end for
The advantage of this encoding scheme is that we can get constant worst execution time for
one query, regardless how many rules are encoded inside a radix tree. As shown in our toy case,
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assuming preﬁxes at most have l bit, the worst searching time for given keys is O(l). Hence, the
scalability in terms of number of rules is improved.
By applying this data structure, we can construct forwarding and ﬁltering function. Given a
virtual network graph G, for each vertex representing a virtual router, a radix tree can be initialized
and associated with that vertex, where the forwarding rules of that router are encoded. In the same
way, radix trees can be established for subnets to encode host routes. As for security groups, two
radix trees can be established with egress and ingress ﬁltering rules respectively. On the other hand,
to address NAT, a lookup table can be applied to build maps of private-public IP pair associated
with router gateways. Therefore, given a forwarding state (p, (u, v)) as deﬁned in deﬁnition 2, we
can use destination IP in p as the key to query the radix tree of v. If the matching result is found
in the radix tree and next hop is pointed to w, the next forwarding state is obtained as (p′, (v,w)),
where p′ may be different from p if NAT is applied in vertex v. On the other hand, if there is no
matching key in the radix tree, a special forwarding state (null, (v, null)) is generated, indicating
that a blackhole is found at the forwarding path. This process can be repeatedly carried out until a
forwarding path is identiﬁed.
With virtual networking graph G and fdG based on radix trees, we propose our baseline so-
lution to verify reachability properties in deﬁnition 3 for VM pairs. Pseudo codes in algorithm 1
demonstrate a high level structure of our baseline solution. (u, v) represents any VM vertex pair
in G, where u is the source, and v is the destination. The sets of all IP addresses assigned to u
and v are denoted as IPu and IPv respectively, including their private and public IP. We use the
set P(u,v) = IPu × IPv to represents a collection of packets that their source and destination IP
addresses are taken from IPu and IPv respectively. For each p ∈ P(u,v), we construct initial for-
warding state s0 = (p, (null, u)) as the input of fdG() to generate the next forwarding state s1. For
any such a forwarding state s, we use s.p to denote the packet extracted from that state, as well as
s.pre and s.cur represent sender and current node. On the other hand, we use a list denote as S
to keep trace of forwarding states. By calling fdG() recursively, either there is a forwarding state
reaches (p, (v, null)) representing v can receive such a packet, or a black hole or a loop described
in deﬁnition 3 is detected. Veriﬁcation results are appended to a list R. For each VM pair, if there
exists at least one forwarding path as deﬁnition 2, they are reachable; otherwise, they are isolated.
23
Although this baseline solution is able to verify VM-level reachability properties in clouds, there
may exist redundant computations that reduce the efﬁciency of veriﬁcation. For example, consider
verifying reachability from one arbitrary VM to multiple VMs within the same subnet. Although
these destination IPs are different, since they are in the same IP address block, it is likely to get
same route in routers. As a result, these forwarding paths may be identical until packets arrive at the
subnet of destinations. Whereas in the baseline solution, since these forwarding paths are veriﬁed
individually, traversals from the source VM to the destination subnet are repeatedly carried out.
Furthermore, if tenants cluster their VMs with high density in subnets, such repeated computation
will get worse. In the next section, we will discuss how to exploit such similarity in forwarding
paths and address associated challenges.
4.2 Prefix-to-Prefix Reachability
As mentioned before, forwarding paths from a VM to VMs within the same subnet may be
similar, while the opposite may also be true. In this section, we use a concrete example to demon-
strate both situations, then introduce our scheme to improve the veriﬁcation efﬁciency, and keep the
ﬂexibility to handle challenges.
4.2.1 Challenges of Prefix-to-Prefix Reachability
One idea to avoid aforementioned redundant computation is to calculate forwarding path from
subnet A to subnet B using the destination preﬁx as the key to query router’s forwarding rules, then
apply the preﬁx-to-preﬁx routing result to any VM pair in A and B before do further veriﬁcation over
ﬁltering rules associated with security groups. But the problem is, this preﬁx-to-preﬁx forwarding
path does not always have an unique result. We use an example shown in ﬁgure 4.2 to demonstrate
the situation.
Example 3 In figure 4.2, in one subnet with CIDR 10.1.0.0/24, four VMs running as database
servers have IP addresses from 10.1.0.1 to 10.1.0.4. Meanwhile, within another subnet with CIDR
10.2.0.0/24, 32 VMs run as application servers that IP addresses range from 10.2.0.1 to 10.2.0.32.




































Figure 4.2: An Example of Preﬁx-to-Preﬁx Reachability
to 10.2.0.0/24 are the target of our discussion, and the relevant forwarding rules are listed in the
upper table.
If we omit the rule at the second row of the table temporally, then the prefix-to-prefix traffic has
the unique forwarding path, which passes R1, R2 and R4 sequentially. Whereas, the tenant may
consider let some parts of such traffic going through R3 for bandwidth or security concerns. When
the second rule is applied, by the longest matching principle, traffic to application servers with IP
ranging from 10.2.0.1 to 10.2.0.15 will pass R1, R3 and R4, while traffic to other application servers
still go through R1, R2, R4. Therefore, the prefix-to-prefix forwarding path of the example splits into
2 branches at R1. Moreover, in virtual networks with larger scale, it is possible that these branches
are split further if corresponding forwarding rules are configured at the successor routers. When
such splitting propagates inside a large virtual network graph, it makes our verification work more
complicated and challenging.
On the other hand, another challenge is about how to query radix trees using a prefix as the key
instead of a single IP address. Furthermore, forwarding path splitting make it even worse as some
destination IP addresses cannot be encoded into a prefix. For example, after such prefix-to-prefix
forwarding path split at R1, the branch going through R2 have destination IP addresses ranged
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from 10.2.0.16 to 10.2.0.255, which is a non-prefix segment that cannot be encoded into one CIDR.
To query routing results in R2 for destination IP addresses ranged from 10.2.0.16 to 10.2.0.255, an
iteration over the range is not so helpful, since there is no significant difference in terms of efficiency
with our baseline solution.
In summary, as shown in example 3, one main challenge of preﬁx-to-preﬁx forwarding path
veriﬁcation is how to manage propagation of path splitting in virtual networking graph, while an-
other one is how to query radix trees efﬁciently with different forms of keys, including preﬁxes and
non-preﬁx segments.
4.2.2 Ranges and X-Fast Trie
A fundamental step to address challenges of preﬁx-to-preﬁx forwarding path is how to represent
IP preﬁxes and non-preﬁx segments. In our context, both of them can be considered as collections
of continuous integers, since each IP address can be converted into an integer with ﬁx length bits.
For instance, an IP v4 address can be represented as a 32 bits integer in its binary form. Therefore,
IP preﬁxes and non-preﬁx segments can be represented as ranges that each of them can be described
by two integers, its lower and upper bounds. For example, the preﬁx 10.2.0.0/24 can be represented
by integers corresponding to IP addresses 10.2.0.0 and 10.2.0.255, while the non-preﬁx segment
described in example 3 can be represented by integers corresponding to 10.2.0.16 and 10.2.0.255
respectively. One range may only contain one integer when the two bounds are identical, which can
reﬂect to special preﬁxes such as 10.2.0.1/32 which represents a single IP.
As shown in example 3, the destination preﬁx 10.2.0.0/24 can be considered as the input
of fdG at R1. After forwarding path splitting caused by rules in R1, 10.2.0.0∼10.2.0.15 and
10.2.0.16∼10.2.0.255 become the inputs of fdG at R3 and R2 respectively. In another word, the
initial destination range is divided into subranges as forwarding paths split. If such splitting prop-
agates further in the virtual network graph, then those subranges will be divided into more speciﬁc
subranges. On the other hand, to verify VM-level reachability, for any given VM IP within the pre-
ﬁx, we need to locate the proper subrange including that IP to obtain the routing result. Therefore,
to address forwarding paths splitting, it is desirable that the data encoding scheme applied to ranges
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has following features:
- Subranges can be inserted to its parent range, as well as its associated routing results.
- Given any integer inside a range, there exist an efﬁcient searching algorithm to ﬁnd routing
results associated to the most speciﬁc subrange where that integer falls into.
X-fast binary trie [12] is a good candidate to fulﬁll above requirements. It is a data structure
to encode integers with ﬁxed length l bits into a l-level binary trie (Note that integers in radix
trees have variable length of bits). Hence, for any range representing the destination preﬁx, we can
initialize a x-fast trie and insert two integers corresponding to the bounds of that range, while its
routing result could be written into the both leaves. When the range is divided into subranges, the
boundary integers of subranges are inserted to the same trie as well as the routing results to leaves.
If forwarding path splitting propagates in the virtual network graph, more boundary integers will
be inserted into the same trie. For each subrange, at most two integers are encoded in the trie,
regardless how many elements that subrange has. As for the extreme case of ranges with identical
bounds, only one leaf is inserted, but labeled as upper and lower bound either. As a result, for a
given destination IP preﬁx, all forwarding paths can be stored and managed in one x-fast trie.
On the other hand, in x-fast tries, given any integer within the range, searching algorithm will
fall into the leaf that corresponds to the boundary integer of the most speciﬁc range to the given
key. This will ensure the proper routing result will be found for any VM with a speciﬁc destination
IP. Further more, such searching algorithm has constant worst execution time regardless how many
subranges the trie has due to x-fast trie’s root-to-leaf binary searching path. With hash table for
each level in x-fast tries, the worst searching time is O(log(l)), better than the ordinary one O(l).
Therefore, x-fast tries can offer scalability and efﬁciency for VM-level forwarding path veriﬁcation.
The example shown in ﬁgure 4.3 demonstrates how IP preﬁxes are encoded into a X-Fast Trie
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Figure 4.3: Ranges Encoded into a X-Fast Trie
Example 4 We use the same virtual network setting in example 3. As analyzed, there is a for-
warding path splitting at R1 from database server subnets(10.1.0.0/24) to application server sub-
nets(10.2.0.0/24). A x-fast trie is initialized with the destination prefix 10.2.0.0/24 to encode sub-
ranges and its routing result. At first, two leaves are inserted, which represents integers correspond-
ing to 10.2.0.0 and 10.2.0.255, labeled as ’L’(lower bound) and ’H’(upper bound) respectively.
Note the level of the trie in figure 4.3 is not 32, which is the length of IP V4 addresses. It is caused
by implementation details and will be explained in section 5.1.
Since a forward path split occurs at R1 due to the forwarding rule, a new range starting with
10.2.0.0 and ending with 10.2.0.15 should be written into the trie. Then a range insertion method
is performed with corresponding integers. Note that new range is overlapped with the initial one,
hence another leaf corresponding to 10.2.0.16 is also inserted, while forwarding results are synchro-
nized between lower and upper bounds. Thus, as the final results, range 1 representing 10.2.0.0/28
have two leaves with forwarding result R1, R3, R4, while range 2 have two leaves containing result
R1, R2, R4, which represents IP address set a \ b, where a and b are set of IP address 10.2.0.0/24
and 10.2.0.0/28 respectively. Note that hash tables for each level of the trie is updated immediately
with leaf insertion. When a routing result search for an individual IP is performed, values stored in
those hash tables are used to compare with the corresponding part of the key to reduce searching
time. With this trie, given a IP say 10.2.0.31 as the key, the routing result will be fetched from the
leaf corresponding to range 1, since this range is the most specific one for 10.2.0.31.
From the example 4, we can see that by encoding routing results of range and its subranges into
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a x-fast trie, forwarding path splitting in virtual network graph, the ﬁrst challenge of preﬁx-to-preﬁx
reachability veriﬁcation, could be well managed.
4.2.3 Query Radix Trees Using Ranges As Keys
As discussed in section 4.2.1, another challenge in the preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability veriﬁcation
is how to query radix trees associated with virtual routers to get routing results using IP preﬁxes and
non-preﬁx segments as keys. Now we introduce our searching method in radix tree addressing this
challenge.
Conventionally, querying routing result in radix trees uses a single key, such as a destination
IP address in our baseline solution. In preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability veriﬁcation, ranges including
preﬁxes and non-preﬁx segments should be used as keys. The naive way that iterates all the elements
in ranges should be excluded, as it will make no gain in terms of efﬁciency compared with our
baseline solution.
At ﬁrst we examine the case that keys are preﬁxes. Comparing with single IP as a key, the search
for a preﬁx is quite similar on bit comparison through radix tree. The difference is that when keys
are preﬁxes, all matching values should be gathered in such a way that the relationship between
routing results and its corresponding subranges of destination should be clearly reﬂected. For this
purpose, a method mixed with binary comparison and preorder traversal is developed, which is
demonstrated in the example shown in ﬁgure 4.4.
Example 5 In figure 4.4, the same radix tree in figure 4.1 is used, while 0* is the key to query all
matched forwarding rules encoded in this tree. The dashed arrows labeled with numbers show the
access sequences. At first, starting from root node, binary comparison is executed for all bits in
the key, and the most specific one is recorded. Obviously, in this tiny example only one bit 0 is
compared shown as step 1, and r0 is the matched result. Then, starting from the node representing
0*, a preorder traversal is performed over the subtree in a recursive way such that the left branch
is firstly traversed, then go back to the upper node and start traversal in the right branch. Such
process is presented as step 2 to 9, where two matching rules r1 and r2 are found. Finally, the
process is terminated when it is returned from right branch of the starting node. By this combined
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Figure 4.4: Querying Matched Rules in a Radix Tree Using a Preﬁx as the Key
Rule Prefix Subrange Next Hop
r0 0* [32:127] IF A21
r1 0000* [0:15] IF A11
r2 0001* [16:31] IF A12
Table 4.1: Subranges And Routing Results In Example 5
method, all matching rules(r0, r1, and r2 in the example)are gathered. Note the traversal will
never reach r3, because the process never go beyond the upper part of the preorder starting node.
Hence, these rules that does not match the key will never be gathered as the result. All routing
results are recorded, as well as the corresponding root-to-node bit sequences that can be converted
to subranges. To make subranges more readable, we use pseudo 8-bit IP addresses in this example.
Therefore, prefix 0* represents IP address space [0:127], while 0000*, 0001* represents [0:15] and
[16:31] respectively. Then the result of query with 0* can be shown as in table 4.1, with the next
hops and its corresponding subranges. Note that the first result corresponds not to [0:127] but to
subrange [32:127], due to the fact that r1 and r2 are more specific than r0.
As shown above, query radix trees using preﬁxes as keys can be done by the method that com-
bines binary comparison and preorder traversal. Notice in the ﬁrst row of table 4.1, a non-preﬁx
subrange [32:127] is generated and it will be the key to query the radix tree of the virtual router say
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Rule Destination Next Hop
r0 * IF A31
r1 0101* IF A41
Table 4.2: An Excerpt of Forwarding Rules In Example 6
R A2. Next, we discuss how to tackle such a non-preﬁx key in the following example.
Example 6 Sample forwarding rules in the virtual router R A2 are given in the table 4.2. Bit
comparison cannot be directly applied since the key [32:127] can not be interpreted as a prefix.
The trick is done by two steps. At first, we use the original prefix 0* as a key to query the routing
results in the radix tree of R A2, with the exact method in example 5. Then we get following result:
- for IP ranged in [0:79], the packet should be forwarded to IF A31 by the rule r0
- for IP ranged in [80:95], the packet should be forwarded to IF A41 by the rule r1
- for IP ranged in [96:127], the packet should be forwarded to IF A31 by r0
In the next step, we extract the results matching the non-prefix key. Thus, we have following routing
results for the key [32:127]:
- for IP ranged in [32:79], the packet should be forwarded to IF A31
- for IP ranged in [80:95], the packet should be forwarded to IF A41
- for IP ranged in [96:127], the packet should be forwarded to IF A31
We call this two-step method as range copy. With range copy, we successfully gather all match-
ing result in radix trees for a non-preﬁx key without iterating all elements in that key. Moreover,
given a virtual router and a destination preﬁx, only one query is needed for all subranges to do such
range copy. Consequently, the result of that query can be cached for reusing.
With the two methods demonstrated in example 5 and 6 altogether, the second challenge of
preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability is addressed.
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4.3 TenantGuard Design
Based on preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability discussed in section 4.2, TenantGuard, a veriﬁcation so-
lution of cloud-wide VM-level network isolation, is presented in this section. At ﬁrst, we give an
overview on its three-step veriﬁcation; then each step is introduced in detail; ﬁnally, we analyze the
complexity.
4.3.1 Three-Step Verification Overview
TenantGuard leverages the hierarchical virtual network model presented in Chapter 3 to partition
virtual networks into a set of private IP preﬁxes (i.e., tenants’ subnets) and a set of public IP preﬁxes
(i.e., external network IP preﬁxes), such that the veriﬁcation can be performed in three steps. As we
will conﬁrm with experimental results in Chapter 6, such a decomposition signiﬁcantly improves
TenantGuard’s performance in a cloud-wide, VM-level veriﬁcation of network isolation.
Data collection & preparation



























Figure 4.5: An Overview of TenantGuard
Figure 4.5 provides an overview of TenantGuard solution. Input data from the cloud infras-
tructure management system, such as virtual routers, subnets, VMs and its ports, are collected and
loaded into a virtual network graph described in Chapter 3 , while router rules, subnets’ host routes,
and security groups rules, are encoded into radix trees associated with vertices in the graph. Then,
preﬁx-level veriﬁcation is carried out using X-fast binary tries. Afterwards, VM-level isolation is
veriﬁed based on preﬁx-level routing results stored in X-fast tries and its associated ﬁltering rules
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encoded in radix trees. Further, VM-level isolation results can be the input of compliance veriﬁca-






















Figure 4.6: An Example of the Three-Step Veriﬁcation
To grasp the intuition behind our three-step veriﬁcation approach, we ﬁrst present an example.
Example 7 Figure 4.6 illustrates the three-step verification using our running example shown in
Figure 3.1.
- In Step 1 (detailed in Section 4.3.2), prefix-level isolation verification within the same
components/sub-graph is performed. For instance, the isolation between SN A2 and SN A3
through the router R A1 belonging to tenant Alice is verified using their respective private IP
prefixes (e.g., 10.0.0.0/24 and 10.0.1.0/24).
- In Step 2 (detailed in Section 4.3.2), prefix-level isolation verification between different
components(e.g., SN A2 and SN B2) is performed via each adjacent external network (e.g.,
ExtNet 1). This step is further decomposed into Step 2.a for verifying isolation between
the first subnet as source(e.g., SN A2) and the external network, and Step 2.b for verifying
isolation between the external network and the second subnet as destination (e.g., SN B2).
This verification also involves public and private IP NAT.
- Finally, Step 3 (detailed in Section 4.3.3) performs VM-level security groups verification
for any pair of subnets found to be reachable using Step 1 and Step 2.
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Algorithm 2 TenantGuard
1: Input: G = (V,E)
2: Output: VM-level isolation results
3: for each Ci in G do
4: for each sij in Ci where sij .type = subnet do
5: for each sik = sij in Ci do
6: BTrieik = initBTrie(sik.CIDR, sij .id)
7: prefix-to-prefix(BTrieik)
8: end for
9: for each v ∈ V |v.type = ext net and ∃ a path from sij to v do
10: BTrieij = initBTrie(v.CIDR, sij .id)
11: prefix-to-prefix(BTrieij)
12: end for
13: for each r, rg ∈ V |r.type = router, rg.type = v router gw, {r, rg} ∈ E, ∃ a path from sij to r do





19: for each pair (VMsrc,VMdst) do
20: VM-to-VM(VMsrc,VMdst)
21: end for
In addition, Algorithm 2 shows a high-level algorithmic view of TenantGuard. It takes the virtual
network graph G as its input. The function initBTrie initializes X-fast binary tries with destination
preﬁxes, while the function prefix-to-prefix (Detailed in Algorithm 3 in Section 4.3.2) employs X-
fast binary tries to verify preﬁx-level isolation between all of source and destination IP preﬁxes pairs.
Lines 5-8 implement Step 1 in example 7, where Ci is a maximally connected sub-graph. Next,
lines 9-16 realize Step 2.a and Step 2.b to verify preﬁx-level isolation between subnets and
external networks. Finally, lines 19-21 carry out Step 3, where the function VM-to-VM checks
VM-level isolation based on their security groups (see Algorithm 4 in Section 4.3.3).
4.3.2 Prefix-Level Verification
Now we detail the function prefix-to-prefix that performs preﬁx-level veriﬁcation.
The function prefix-to-prefix takes an initialized x-fast trie as its input, where two leaves rep-
resenting lower and upper bounds of the destination preﬁx are inserted by calling the function
initBTrie, as shown Algorithm 2. A set of variables is initialized within each leaf, including B,
RLB, HR, etc.





3: for each range [L,H ] in btrie.leaves with RLB = 00 do
4: router = get(HR,r id)
5: dest = getroot(btrie)
6: if searchTries(dest, router) = false then
7: TempBTrie = Match(RadixTree(router), dest)
8: else
9: TempBTrie = getBTrie(dest, router)
10: end if
11: Copy(btrie, T empBTrie, [L,H ])
12: counter = counter + 1
13: end for
14: if counter = 0 then
15: prefix-to-prefix(btrie)
16: end if
lower bound, H for the upper bound, or LH if a single leaf with a speciﬁc IP address (e.g.,
1.10.0.2/32).
- Variable RLB is a two-bit ﬂag that indicates the status of the veriﬁcation process, where
possible values are 00 for no decision yet, 01 for loop found, 10 for blackhole found, or 11
for reachability veriﬁed. When an x-fast trie is initialized with the preﬁx, RLB is 00 within
the both bounds.
- Variable HR is a sequence of triplets (r id, r if, src) that stores the history of the visited
nodes from source for that IP range, where r id is a router id, r if is a router interface and
src is the original source node. Initial values of HR are obtained from the query result over
the source subnet’s radix tree with the key taken from the destination preﬁx, since the rules
encoded in that radix tree decide which router should be chosen as the next hop of the source
subnet.
As shown in Algorithm 3, the function prefix-to-prefix recursively locates leaf nodes with RLB
labeled as 00 and the corresponding subrange of destinations, extract the current router from variable
HR, and queries the corresponding radix tree using the destination preﬁx as the key. A temporary
trie is used to encode the query result, then the routing results corresponding to the current subrange
are copied to btrie. Note that in Algorithm 3 Line 6-10 show that these temporary tries can be
cached and reused. The function is terminated at the absence of leaves with RLB equal to 00 in
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btrie, which means the preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability is identiﬁed for all subranges of the destination
preﬁx. The core of this algorithm is the Match and Copy functions, which are the implementations
for the methods regarding querying radix trees using ranges as keys, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.
We can use the function prefix-to-prefix to verify preﬁx-level isolation on each hop between
all pairs of source and destination IP preﬁxes. It is clear that for a given pair of preﬁxes, the
prefix-to-prefix veriﬁes routing rules on a per-hop basis. In all hops between a given pair of preﬁxes,
it uses the same btrie to update the new results according to the routing results over the node’s radix
tree using each IP range as the query key. Hence, for any preﬁx pair, such btrie helps to ﬁnd routing
results for every forwarding path branch in the virtual network graph, and each routing result is
encoded into leaves representing the corresponding subrange, which is ready for querying by any
individual IP in the range.
Now we use an example to show the progressive update inside the btrie using prefix-to-prefix to

























































(a) Leaves After Query Over Radix Tree of Source Subnet

































(e) Leaves After Query Over Radix Tree of R2 (f) Leaves after Query Over Radix Tree of R4
(b) Leaves after Query Over Radix Tree of R1
* 10.2.0.0/24 is the key used in Queries
Figure 4.7: Leaves of a X-fast Trie in the Preﬁx-Level Veriﬁcation
Example 8 In this example, reachability from prefix 10.1.0.0/24 to 10.2.0.0/24 is verified. Fig-
ure 4.7 shows insertion and update of leaves in the x-fast trie. Three aforementioned variables are
presented: B, HR and RLB. To make it more readable, bit-string of leaves are replaced with its
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corresponding IP address, meanwhile only router names are shown for HR in a reverse order of
access. For example, HR R4/3/1 show a router access sequence R1, R3 and R4. When RLB is 00,
the next hop will be R4. Note that the key 10.2.0.0/24 is used throughout queries.
- In step a, two leaves representing the range 10.2.0.0/24 are inserted. Based on the query
result over radix tree of source subnet where host routes are encoded, since default gateway
is R1, HR at both leaves are R1, while RLB with 00 indicates the forwarding path verification
for this range is on going.
- In step b, since the query result over R1 radix tree leads to forwarding path split, two sub-
ranges need to be encoded into btrie: from 10.2.0.0 to 10.2.0.15, and from 10.2.0.16 to
10.2.0.255. For the former, its next hop is R3 while for the latter it is R2. Hence, HRs of
leaves are updated as R3/1 and R2/1 respectively.
- Step c shows updating the first subrange after the query over R3 radix tree. Consequently,
HRs are updated to R4/3/1 for the subrange.
- In step d, a query is executed over R4 radix tree. By forwarding rules in R4 the destination
subnet is reached, since 10.0.2.0/24 is directly connected to R4. As the result, RLB is updated
to 11 showing that the final result is reachable for the subrange.
- Since RLB of the first subrange is 11, prefix-to-prefix jumps to the next subrange, as shown
in steps e and f. As this is a non-prefix subrange, range copy is used to update the result.
Similarly, the forwarding path ends up with R4 while the final value of corresponding RLB is
11.
Example 8 demonstrates how prefix-to-prefix is applied to step 1 of TenantGuard. For Step
2 it is quite similar. As aforementioned, in Step 2.a, public preﬁx of the external network is
used to initialize a x-fast trie, while the graph traversal using prefix-to-prefix starts from the source
subnet. On the other hand, in Step 2.b, another x-fast trie is initialized with the private preﬁx of
the destination subnet, and the corresponding router gateway connected to the external network is
selected as the start vertex of the graph traversal. Both of them use the same prefix-to-prefix function
as step 1, except there are two btrie to encode preﬁx-level routing results in step 2.
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4.3.3 VM-Level Isolation Verification
Preﬁx-level results computed in Section 4.3.2 are used to determine subnet pairs that are not
isolated. For those subnets, we need to perform a VM-level isolation veriﬁcation by checking for
each pair of VMs their corresponding security groups using both private and public IP addresses.
Algorithm 4 describes the VM-to-VM procedure in which function Route-Lookup checks whether
there exists a forwarding path between any two VM ports, whereas the V erifySecGroups function
veriﬁes security groups of these VMs.
Algorithm 4 VM-to-VM(VMsrc,VMdest)
1: Triepub = getBTrie(VMdst.publicIP.CIDR, VMsrc. subnet id)
2: Triepriv = getBTrie(VMdst.privateIP.CIDR, router id)
3: routable =Route-Lookup(Triepub, T riepriv)
4: if routable = true then
5: V erifySecGroups(VMsrc,VMdest)
6: end if
The VM-to-VM route lookup is to get routing results of preﬁx-level reachability by searching
in the relevant binary tries, while the destination IP addresses of these VM pairs are used as the key.
As discussed in section 4.2, such query will ﬁnd the boundary node of the most speciﬁc subrange
including the individual VM IP. Therefore, the RLB value of the node can be retrieved as the routing
result in virtual network graph for the VM pair. For example, considering the setting in example 8,
and the x-fast trie shown in the step f of ﬁgure 4.7) as the preﬁx-level routing result, now we need
to check the route from VM 10.1.0.2 to VM 10.2.0.15. The integer corresponding to 10.2.0.15 is
used as key to query the trie. Then the second leaf from the left will be reached where RLB is 11,
then we know routing from VM 10.1.0.2 to 10.2.0.15 is reachable. In addition, if VMs have public
IP, two btrie obtained from step 2 of preﬁx-level veriﬁcation are queried. Accordingly, the route
lookups for these cases also consist of two substeps. Firstly, integer corresponding to the public
IP of destination VM is used to query the x-fast trie obtained in Step 2.a, which is initialized
with public preﬁx. Afterwards, the integer mapping to the private IP of destination VM is used as
the key to query the trie generated in Step 2.b. Only RLB having value of 11 in both of query
results means that a routing path passing external networks is present from the source VM to the
destination VM.
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Security Group Direction Prefix Protocol Port Allowed
1 egress 10.2.0.0/28 tcp 3306 yes
1 ingress 10.2.0.0/28 tcp 3306 yes
2 egress 10.1.0.0/24 tcp 3306 yes
2 egress any tcp 80, 443 yes
2 ingress 10.1.0.0/24 tcp 3306 yes
2 ingress any tcp 80, 443 yes
Table 4.3: An Excerpt of Security Group Rules
Once a forwarding path is found between the pair of VMs, we then verify both security groups
associated with these VMs. According to the type of communication, either private or public IP
will be used. For each VM within a source subnet, we use its egress security group radix tree and
perform a ﬁrst-match with the key from public or private IP of the destination VM. Then, we use the
ingress security group of the destination VM and perform a ﬁrst-match with the public or private IP
of the source VM. If both results indicate matching rules with the accept decisions, then the pair of
VMs can be concluded to be reachable using their public or private IP addresses.
We continue to use the setting in ﬁgure 4.2 with the sample security group rules shown in
table 4.3. let say VM 10.1.0.1 and 10.2.0.15 are attached with security group 1 and 2 in table 4.3
respectively. Using integer mapping to the destination IP 10.2.0.15 as the key to query egress
radix tree of security group 1, the ﬁltering result will be allowed, since the key match the preﬁx
10.2.0.0/28. Similarly, it will have same outcome using integer mapping to 10.1.0.1 to query ingress
radix tree of security group 2 attached to the destination VM. Therefore, the VM pair is veriﬁed to
be reachable. If VM 10.2.0.15 is replaced with 10.2.0.16, then we get negative ﬁltering result, since
no match preﬁx can be found in security group 1. Hence, the two VM will be veriﬁed as isolated
since the access is denied by the ﬁltering rules associated with the source VM, even though a route
exists between the pair.
We have shown how to verify isolation on VM-level. Although techniques such as radix trees
are applied to improve scalability over security group rules, as well as preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithm to
address the repeated computation over routing, the amounts of VM pairs in large scale clouds are
still huge. Consequently, the VM-level veriﬁcation will be time-consuming for such clouds. We
address this challenge by using parallel computation to distribute the veriﬁcation tasks to multiple
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servers simultaneously, which will discussed in chapter 5.
4.3.4 Complexity Analysis
Let S be the number of subnets, R be the number of routers between two preﬁxes (i.e., number
of hops), L be the length of keys (whose maximum value is 32 for an exact IP address), M be the
number of VMs, and Nex be the number of external networks. Complexities related to the data
structure manipulation are known to be O(L) for insert operation in X-fast binary tries, O(Log(L))
for search operations in X-fast binary tries, and O(L) for radix trie matching per router.
In Step 1 and Step 2, the complexity of preﬁx-to-preﬁx reachability veriﬁcation (Algo-
rithm 3) is O((S2 + 2 × S × Nex) × R × K × (L + log(L))), where K represents the number
of operations performed over the data structures for each routing node. This can be approximated
to O(S2) for large data centers where the number of subnets is larger than the number of external
networks (Nex  S) and the number of hops is usually limited for delay optimization (R  S),
with L and K being constants. In Step 3, the complexity of VM-level veriﬁcation (Algorithm 4)
is O(2 ∗ (L+ Log(L)) ∗M2) and can be approximated to O(M2).
We thus obtain an overall complexity of O(S2+M2). However, this only provides a theoretical
upper bound, which typically will not be reached in practice. In general, depending on the com-
munication patterns in multi-tenant clouds, the number of interconnected subnets is usually smaller
than S as trafﬁc isolation is the predominant required property in such environments. For example,
it has been reported in the work by Ballani et al. [30] that inter-tenant trafﬁc varies between 10%
and 35% only. Thus, if we denote by M ′ the number of VMs belonging to connected subnets, it is




We have implemented our baseline solution discussed in section 4.1, as well as TenantGuard
based on preﬁx-to-preﬁx veriﬁcation discussed in section 4.3, using OpenStack [8] as cloud manage-
ment system, and Java as programming language. In this chapter, we describe our implementation
details about data collection and preprocessing, parallel veriﬁcation, and integration to OpenStack
Congress.
5.1 Data Collection and Preprocessing
5.1.1 Data Collection
To build a snapshot of the virtual networking infrastructure for auditing, we collect data from
OpenStack databases. In OpenStack, VMs are managed by the compute service Nova, while
Neutron manages virtual networking resources in the cloud. Data related to these services are
stored in two databases nova and neutron, while each of them contains over one hundred ta-
bles. Among them, information about VM ports, routers, subnets are located at table of neutron
named ports, routers and subnets respectively, while some of their attributes are stored in
other tables. For instance, assigned IPs for virtual ports are located in ipallocations. The rela-
tionships of virtual networking elements and these attributes are established by primary and foreign
keys of these tables. Some of such mappings are listed in the table 5.1. For example, by primary
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Primary Key Foreign Key Established Relation
nova.instances.ID neutron.ports.device id VM and VM ports
neutron.ports.ID neutron.ipallocations.port id Port and its private IP
neutron.ports.ID neutron.ﬂoatingips.ﬁxed port id Port and its public IP
neutron.routers.ID neutron.ports.device id Router and its interfaces
neutron.subnets.ID neutron.ipallocations.subnet id Subnet and ports
Table 5.1: Some of Virtual Network Elements Data in nova and neutron Databases
Primary Key Foreign Key Established Relation
ports.ID securitygroupportbindings.port id VM Port and its security group
routers.ID routerroutes.router id Router and its forwarding rules
subnets.ID subnetroutes.subnet id Subnet and its host routes
Table 5.2: Forwarding and Filtering Rules in OpenStack neutron Database
key nova.instances.idand foreign key neutron.ports.device id, the connection be-
tween one VM and its attached virtual port can be identiﬁed. Similarly, by neutron.ports.id
and neutron.ipallocations, IP addresses of ports can be collected.
On the other hand, we need to collect forwarding and ﬁltering rules, and link them to correspond-
ing virtual network elements. Table 5.2 shows primary and foreign keys in neutron database that
establish relations between rules and elements. Note for routers, besides explicit rules directly ex-
tracted from the table routerroutes in neutron database, implicit rules associated with router
interfaces are also fetched.
After sorting out above relationships, data with regard to virtual network elements and associ-
ated rules can be collected by SQL queries.
5.1.2 Data Preprocessing
Through data preprocessing, collected raw data from SQL queries are encoded into data struc-
tures discussed in Chapter 4, while the virtual networking graph is constructed accordingly.
Hash tables
From SQL query results, we instantiated various objects to represent virtual network elements,
while sets of methods are developed to access attributes of these objects. Moreover, We use hash
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table to organize these objects, where UUIDs of virtual network elements are used as the keys.
Therefore, to access any attribute or method of a given virtual network element, a search in hash
tables using its UUID is performed. As a result, an object representing the targeting virtual network
element is returned, and all methods related to that object are ready to be invoked.
Virtual Network Graph
The next step is to construct virtual network graph. JGraphT [31] is selected as the graph library
in our application. The virtual network graph G inherits the simple graph in the JGraphT library.
Vertices are inserted as discussed in Section 3.2, while edges are added in the way described in
Table 3.1. Although vertex in JGraphT is type safe so that any java object could be used as a vertex,
above virtual network element objects are not directly used as vertices. Instead, we create an uniﬁed
vertex object where UUIDs are stored to keep the graph being compact. Hence, when a graph
traversal arrives at one vertex and function fd G need to be accessed, the corresponding object and
related methods are available through UUIDs of objects stored in vertices.
Rules in Radix Trees
Forwarding and ﬁltering rules are encoded into radix trees associated with objects of virtual
network elements. For each router or subnet instance, there is one radix tree object containing all the
associated rules. On the other hand, for each VM instance, there are two radix tree objects to encode
ingress and egress ﬁltering rules respectively. We implement our custom radix trees, offering query
methods with various keys, as discussed in section 4.2.3, to support veriﬁcation processes based on
preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithms.
In the raw data of SQL query result, nexthops of rules are represented as IP addresses, which
could be overlapped between different tenant’s private virtual networks. To offer features support-
ing overlapped IP addresses, in our application, UUIDs of corresponding virtual ports and routers
are inserted to nexthops. Hence, for any given nexthop, it can be distinguished from other router
interfaces using the same IP address.
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X-Fast Binary Trie
In TenantGuard solution, one of the basic data structures is x-fast Binary trie. We implement it
as introduced in Morin’s book [32], where leaves are chained by a double list and one dumb node
is introduced to join the both ends of leaves as a ring. Therefore, to traverse all the subrange in a
x-fast trie, we can simply start from the dumb node along the double list in one direction, instead of
repeatedly from the root node down to the leaves in the trie. Consequently, it is easier to efﬁciently
implement algorithm 3 in which the iteration of all subranges in x-fast tries is needed. Similarly,
such double list is used for range copy to traverse all leaves in that subrange, as explained in section
4.2.
On the other hand, in the original x-fast trie of Morin’s book [32] the root node always links
to nodes representing the ﬁrst bit of integers. Whereas in our implementation, we use a preﬁx to
initialize a trie, where the root node represents all bits of the preﬁx, since all subranges generated
later will be within this preﬁx. For example, given the initial preﬁx 1001*, the root node represents
integer corresponding to 1001. As a result, the level of tries reduces from l to l − x, where l is
the number of bits for IP addresses, and x is length of preﬁxes in bits. There are twofold advan-
tages from this modiﬁcation: more compact space and less searching time, since one search costs
O(log(l − x)) instead of O(log(l)). Additionally, we implement subrange write function in the
x-fast trie in an atomic operation to ensure variables being consistent between a pair of boundary
nodes.
Another implementation detail about x-fast trie is reusing temporary trie created during range
copy. In our application, these temporary tries are cached into a hash table for reuse, where strings
concatenating initial preﬁxes and router IDs are used as the keys. Hence, for a given router and
a preﬁx, the query over this router’s radix tree is only executed once during 3-step veriﬁcation of
TenantGuard.
With the virtual networking graph and preprocessed data, we implement our applications based





As analyzed at the end of Section 4.3.3, the huge amount of VM pair in large-scale clouds
will be a challenge, since ultimately we need to search routing results and verify security group
rules for each VM pair in step 3, regardless to what extent we have improved the efﬁciency
and scalability in previous steps. To address such challenge, we extend TenantGuard to a parallel
environment in such a way that whole veriﬁcation task could be divided into many pieces, which
can be distributed and performed at multiple servers separately, and the outcomes can be collected
























Figure 5.1: TenantGuard Parallel Implementation
We use open source Apache Ignite [33] as our parallel computation platform, enabling to dis-
tribute workload in real time across hundreds of servers. TenantGuard parallelization consists of
two parts, the veriﬁcation controller and the compute worker cluster.
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Verification Controller
The veriﬁcation controller runs TenantGuard parallelization application on a single server with






Collector and Encoder are the modules to perform data collection and preprocessing, as
discussed in Section 5.1. Profiler collects the computation capacity and metrics of the compute
worker cluster, such as the number of cores, CPU loads, etc. According to the data generated by
Profiler,Scheduler dynamically divides the veriﬁcation task on the preﬁx level and encapsu-
late the pieces as Java callables, while Dispatcherworks in an asynchronous mode to distribute
these Java callables and the data such as graph, radix trees and hash tables to compute worker
nodes through data streaming, where java callables are executed individually follow the three-step
veriﬁcation process discussed in Section 4.3. To support object serialization in data streaming,
Serializable interface is implemented in all involved Java classes of TenantGuard. When each
distributed task terminates, the result is collected immediately by Dispatcher and then summa-
rized by Scheduler.
Compute Worker Cluster
The cluster consists of the Ignite nodes, which discover each other either automatically when
they are located in the same LAN, or through ignite conﬁguration ﬁles when they are distributed
in a more complex networking environment. For each node, only JVM and Ignite platform are
needed to be deployed. All the code and data for TenantGuand veriﬁcation are received in runtime
on demand. When tasks are received, the three-step veriﬁcation codes and data are extracted from
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the java callables. Local resources such as number of CPUs are obtained through Java Runtime
instance and used to calculate appropriate number of threads. Subsequently, veriﬁcation tasks are
further divided into multiple threads that are performed simultaneously so that local resources can
be fully utilized. In each thread, when preﬁx-level and VM-level veriﬁcation are ﬁnished, the result
is reported to the callable. After all threads exit, the overall result is sent back to the controller.
With TenantGuard parallelization, we can easily adjust the number of compute workers in the
cluster, to handle VM -level virtual network isolation veriﬁcation for clouds with different scales,
since each worker only needs JVM and Ignite installed. Hence, TenantGuard is scalable to large-
scale clouds veriﬁcation.
5.3 Integration to OpenStack Congress
We further integrate TenantGuard into OpenStack Congress service [25]. Congress implements
policy as a service in OpenStack in order to provide governance and compliance for dynamic in-
frastructures. Congress can integrate third party veriﬁcation tools using a data source driver mech-
anism [25]. Using Congress policy language that is based on Datalog, we deﬁne several tenant
speciﬁc security policies. We then use TenantGuard to detect network isolation breaches between
multiple tenants. TenantGuard’s results are in turn provided as input for Congress to be asserted by
the policy engine. This allows integrating compliance status for some policies whose veriﬁcation is
not supported by Congress (e.g. reachability veriﬁcation as mentioned in Chapter 2). TenantGuard
can successfully verify VM reachability results against security policies deﬁned inside the same
tenant and among different tenants. TenantGuard can also detect breaches to network isolation. For
example, we test an attack in which, through unauthorized access to the OpenStack management
interface, the attacker authorizes some malicious VMs to have access to the virtual networks from
other tenants. TenantGuard can successfully detect all such injected security breaches providing the




This section presents experimental results. At ﬁrst, we introduce the settings of our experiments,
including data sets and testing environments. Secondly, we report a set of results that quantitatively
compare TenantGuard not only with our baseline solution, but also with NoD [21] and its later work
[7]. Finally, we show the results that our application runs on a real cloud.
6.1 Experimental Settings
Our test cloud is based on OpenStack version Kilo with Neutron network driver, implemented by
ML2 OpenVSwitch and L3 agent plugins, which are popular networking deployments with Open-
Stack [8]. There are one controller node integrated with networking service, and up to 80 compute
nodes. Tenants’ VMs are initiated from the Tiny CirrOS image [8], separated by VLAN inside
the compute nodes, while VxLAN tunnels are used for the VM communication across the compute
nodes.
We generate two series of datasets (i.e., SNET and LNET) for the evaluation. The SNET dataset
represents small to medium virtual networks containing six subnets, routers and VMs generated in
OpenStack, while we vary different factors such as the number of VMs per subnet, the number of
rules per router, and the number of hops between subnets, to examine correspondent characteristics
of our algorithms. On the other hand, the LNET dataset represents large networks, where each vir-
tual network is organized in a three-tier structure in such a way that one ﬁrst-tier router is connected
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DataSet VMs Routers Subnets Reachable Paths
DS1 4362 300 525 > 5.67 million
DS2 10168 600 1288 > 29.2 million
DS3 14414 800 1828 > 57.0 million
DS4 20207 1000 2580 > 109 million
DS5 25246 1200 3210 > 168 million
Table 6.1: LNET Dataset Description
to the external network, while the others use extra routes to forward packets between each other. So
in essence they are synthetic. Security rules are generated in the same logic behind the deployment
of two-tier applications in the cloud. For a given tenant, one group of VMs can only communicate
with each other but not with other tenants, while another group is open to be reached from any-
where. Up to 25,246 VMs are created in the test cloud, with 1,200 virtual routers, 3,210 subnets,
and over 43,000 allocated IP addresses. As a reference, according to a recent report [8], 94% of
interrogated OpenStack deployments have less than 10,000 IPs. Therefore, we consider the scale of
our largest dataset is a representative of large size clouds. The ﬁve datasets in LNET are described
in Table 6.1. We use open-source Apache Ignite [33] as the parallel computation platform, which
can distribute the workload in real-time across hundreds of servers. On the other hand, all datasets
for NoD are generated synthetically using the provided generator1.
6.2 Results
We evaluate the performance of our approaches and the effect of various factors on the perfor-
mance, as well as abilities to identify networking anomaly such as forwarding loops .
6.2.1 SNET Results
This set of experiments is to test how network structure and conﬁguration inﬂuence the perfor-
mance of our system. All tests using SNET datasets are conducted with a Linux PC having 2 Intel
i7 2.8GHz CPU and 2GB memory. Note that in this part of experiments, the veriﬁcation time for








































Figure 6.1: SNET Performance Comparison
Varying the # of (a) VMs per Subnet, (b) Routing Rules, and (c) Hops, while Fixing the # of Subnets
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The ﬁrst examined factor is VM density in subnets. As shown in Figure 6.1(a), when the number
of VMs per subnet is increased from 100 to 500, the preﬁx-to-preﬁx isolation veriﬁcation time
increases much slower than the baseline algorithm (deﬁned in Section 4.1) and Nod, which shows
TenantGuard’s better scalability. The reason behind these results is, as illustrated in complexity
analysis in section 4.3.4, the preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithm reduces the complexity to O(R + N2), in
contrast to O(R∗N2) in the baseline algorithm, where R is the number of hops and N is the number
of VMs; when N increases, the complexity O(R ∗N2) increases much faster than O(R +N2).
Another factor is the number of forwarding rules in routers. As shown in Figure 6.1(b), when the
number of routing rules per router increase exponentially, the veriﬁcation time remains relatively
stable due to using radix tree and X-fast trie, both of which have constant searching time. Still,
the performance of preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithm is only nearly one quarter of the baseline’s for each
setting, which shows the improved efﬁciency of TenantGuard. On the other hand, NoD veriﬁcation
time mainly depends on the number of rules, hence, increasing the number of rules results in a
signiﬁcant increase in the veriﬁcation time.
The last factor is hops between VMs. As it increases the complexity of the veriﬁcation (it
corresponds to the number of virtual routers on a communication path), we vary the number of hops
between VMs. We investigate the average number of hop usually encountered in real life systems
2Note that for NoD, we vary the number of pairs from 1 to 5 through the X axis, and for TenantGuard, we consider
all possible pairs of VMs as the X axis depicts the number of VMs
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Figure 6.2: LNET Performance Comparison in the Single-Machine Mode
(a)Showing Data Collection Time, and (b) Showing Veriﬁcation Time
(e.g., Internet) and according to related researches [34] [35], the average number of hops varies
between 12 to 19; hence, to stress out our approach more, we vary the number of hops between 2
to 26. Figure 6.1(c) shows that the preﬁx-to-preﬁx veriﬁcation experiences negligible changes. In
contrast, a fourfold increase in the overhead is observed with the baseline algorithm. We exclude
NoD from this experiment, as the NoD algorithm does not consider hops as one of the parameters.
Overall, TenantGuard is more efﬁcient and scalable over all of the three factors, comparing with
the baseline algorithm and Nod.
6.2.2 LNET Results Using Amazon EC2
The LNET datasets are used to examine the scalability of our system for large virtual networks.
Hence, factors examined in the SNET dataset are kept invariant for each subnet, and the number of
tenant’s subnets, routers and total amount of VMs are varied as shown in Table 6.1. There are two
modes for LNET tests: single-machine mode and parallel mode.
Single-Machine Mode
Single-machine tests are conducted on one EC2 C4.large instance at AWS EC2 with 2 vCPU and
3.75 GB memory. As shown in Figure 6.2(a), data collection and processing time varies between
1.5 to 2 seconds, including data collecting and preprocessing, which shows that the collection time
is not the prominent part of the execution time. Meanwhile, Figure 6.2(b) compares the veriﬁcation
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NoD Nod with symmetry and surgery TenantGuard
1000 routers, 820k rules, 100k VMs Same as NoD 1200 routers, 850k rules, 100k VMs
131 hours 2 hours 1056 seconds
Table 6.2: Comparison of All-pair Reachability with NoD
time between the the baseline and TenantGuard. When the number of subnets and VMs increases,
the preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithm is more efﬁcient than the baseline algorithm. For 25,246 VMs in
3,250 subnets, it takes 108 seconds using the preﬁx-to-preﬁx algorithm and around 628 seconds for
the baseline algorithm. Note that totally over 168 millions VM pairs are veriﬁed as reachable in this
dataset.
Comparison with NoD
In Plotkin et al. [7], all-pair VM reachability veriﬁcation results are reported over one data
center with less than 1000 routers, 820k forwarding and ACL rules, and 100k VMs. To compare
with them, we increase number of VM to 100k as well as rules to 850k based on our dataset DS5,
which has 1200 virtual routers. TenantGuard is tested over this extended dataset, and the comparison
is reported in table 6.2. NoD takes 131 hours(about 5.5 days) to verify all-pair reachability while
with symmetry and surgery in its later work [7] it is improved to 2 hours, while TenantGuard only
takes approximately 18 minutes to verify all-pair reachability over a dataset with similar scale. Note
our comparison is limited on all-pair reachability, since NoD is designed as a general networking
veriﬁcation tool.
Parallel Verification Test
Although our approach already demonstrates signiﬁcant performance improvements over the
baseline algorithm, the results are still based on a single machine. In a real cloud, the veriﬁca-
tion tasks can be easily parallelized among many machines to further improve the performance.
Therefore, we extend our approach to achieve parallel veriﬁcation, where the isolation veriﬁcation
is distributed among the nodes of worker cluster, except the data collection and initialization run
on a single node. This parallel implementation provides larger memory capacity to our approach,
and results in much shorter veriﬁcation times. For the parallel mode, one EC2 C4.xlarge instance
52






























    
>$>#>""" @>"
Figure 6.3: Performance Improvement of Parallel Veriﬁcation with LNET Data
(a) Veriﬁcation Time while Varying the Number of Worker Nodes in Amazon EC2 for Different
Datasets, and (b) Speedup Analysis over the Number of VMs Using 16 Worker Nodes
with 4 vCPU is conﬁgured as the controller, and up to 16 instances of the same type with a compute
worker cluster, while node discovery and communications are established by their internal IPs.
Figure 6.3(a) shows the performance of parallel veriﬁcation using 2 to 16 worker nodes. Clearly,
for each dataset, by increasing the number of worker nodes, in contrast to the result of the single
machine mode, the overheads decrease signiﬁcantly. For example, in contrast to 108 seconds in the
single machine mode, it only takes approximately 13 seconds in the parallel mode with 16 workers,
while over 160 millions of paths are veriﬁed as reachable.
In Figure 6.3(b), we examine the relationship between the cluster size and speedup gain. The
overhead of parallel computation can be divided into two parts: task distribution time to send input
data from the controller to different workers, namely Td, and execution time on those nodes (we
ignore the result generation time due to the small size of result data). We note that, even if the tasks
could be divided evenly, which is unlikely the case in practice, the tasks could still arrive at worker
nodes at different time. As a result, some of those tasks may start signiﬁcantly later than others due
to networking delay, while the overall performance is always decided by the slower runners. As
Td becomes larger, it becomes more predominant in the overall execution time. However, due to
the lack of knowledge on task execution sequence in the synchronous mode, we cannot accurately
measure the distribution time. Additionally, there will always be some tasks which begin later than









































Figure 6.4: Forwarding Loop Detection with Injected Rules
an asynchronous task distribution technique. In Figure 6.3(b), the x-axis represents the ratio Td/T ,
while T is the overall veriﬁcation time. In addition, the speedup ratio (Rs) is the performance
ratio between sequential and parallel programs, represented by y-axis. With the number of worker
nodes increasing, Td rises as expected because more data and code need to be transferred among
cluster nodes. When it becomes more dominant, the speedup rate increases more gradually. For the
smallest dataset, Rs decreases when the number of workers ranges from 8 to 16. The Td/T ratio
can be used to decide the optimal data size in each node.
Our experiment results show that even a small number (i.e., 16) of working nodes can handle
large-scale veriﬁcation (i.e., 168 millions of VM pairs); recalling that real world clouds have the
size of 100,000 users and maximum 1,000 VMs for each user. Also, our speed-up analysis (Figure
6.3(b)) illustrates that for the smallest data set DS1, after 8 nodes the speedup goes down. Therefore,
we restrict the number of working nodes to 16.
Forwarding Loop Detection
We also test forwarding loop detection by injecting error data, as shown in ﬁgure 6.4. The
setting is similar to ﬁgure 4.2, but with some conﬁguration changes. Firstly, a link is added between
router R2 and R3, while IP addresses follow what we use in experiments. Secondly, a rule is added
54
in R2 for redirecting packets to 10.0.15.0/28 towards R3. Finally, we inject a rule in R4 which
causes loop in forwarding paths from database servers to application servers, which is in bold at
the last row of the upper table in ﬁgure 6.4. Consider a forwarding path from VM1 1 to VM15 15,
which is labeled with arrows in the ﬁgure. In R1 the packet will be forwarded to R3, since the
most speciﬁc preﬁx for the destination 10.0.15.15 in R1 is 10.0.15.0/28. Sequentially, it will be
forwarded to R4, then the injected rule in R4 will route packets to R2, then come back to R3, where
a forwarding loop is formed. On the other hand, from the same source, packets to VM15 16 which
IP address is 10.0.15.16 will be routed correctly, due to the fact that the most speciﬁc matching
preﬁx for 10.0.15.16 is 10.0.15.0/24 in R1, R2, and R4. In the experiments, our tool can accurately
identify every VM pair with forwarding loops such as from VM1 1 to VM15 15, as well as normal
forwarding path such as from VM1 1 to VM15 16, although the two destination VMs are located in
the same subnet.
6.2.3 Experiment with Real Cloud
We further tested TenantGuard using data collected from a real community cloud hosted at one
of the largest telecommunications vendors. The main objective is to evaluate the real world appli-
cability of TenantGuard (this dataset is not suitable for performance evaluation due to the relatively
small scale of the cloud). All tests are performed in a single machine using the collected dataset
without any modiﬁcation. The tested cloud consists of only nine routers and 10 subnets. Initially, the
TenantGuard veriﬁcation process fails due to a minor incompatability issue between the OpenStack
version used in our lab (Kilo) and an earlier version used inside the real cloud (Juno). From Open-
Stack Juno to Kilo, two new ﬁelds are added to the neutron.networks table, namely, ’mtu’ int(11)
and ’vlan transparent’ tinyint(1). This difference between the two versions has prevented Tenant-
Guard to execute SQL queries against table neutron.networks due to the missing ’mtu’ ﬁeld. After
addressing this issue by altering the neutron.networks table, TenantGuard successfully completes




In this discussion, we provide the required effort to adopt TenantGuard in other cloud platforms
e.g., Amazon, Google, VMware. Additionally, we discuss existing methods to build a chain of trust
to preserve the integrity of the collected data.

































































Table 7.1: TenantGuard Supported Routing and Filtering in Different Cloud Platforms
We review packet routing and ﬁltering in different cloud platforms and show the applicability of
TenantGuard. Table 7.1 shows how routing and ﬁltering are implemented in OpenStack, Amazon
AWS EC2-VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) [36], Google Compute Engine(GCE) [37], Microsoft Azure
[38], and VMware vCloud Director (vCD) [39]. Similar to OpenStack, all other platforms allow
tenants to create private networks and to create routing rules to govern communication between
them. Those rules are captured by the forwarding and ﬁltering function fdG in our model. VMs
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attached to those private networks can have private IPs and public IPs respectively for intra-tenant
and inter-tenant communication. In the case of inter-tenant communication, gateways are endowed
with NAT services in order to manage mapping between private and public IP addresses. NAT rules
are captured in our model by the function fdG. Internet gateways in EC2-VPC, system route to the
Internet in Azure, and edge gateways in vCD can be represented in our model by the component
v router gw. Exceptionally, in EC2-VPC, the VPC peering routing can be employed to enable
private IP connections across tenants’ virtual networks with tenants’ agreement. To support this
feature, the deﬁnition of fdG will need to be extended. Security groups in OpenStack and EC2,
ﬁrewall rules in ECG, network security groups in Azure, and edge ﬁrewall services in vCD are set up
to ﬁlter VMs’ outbound/inbound packets. Those ﬁltering rules are also supported by TenantGuard
via the forwarding and ﬁltering function fdG.
Preserving integrity of the system. There are existing techniques on trusted auditing to establish
a chain of trust, e.g., [40, 41, 42]. Bellare et al. [40] propose a MAC-based approach. However,
they provide the forward integrity by using chain of keys and erasing previous keys so that any old
logs cannot be altered. Crosby et al. [41] also present a tree-based history data structure, which pre-
vents log tampering where the author of the log is untrusted. Apart from tamper prevention, there
are some other works to further detect tampering logs. Chong et al. [43] implements the Schneier
and Kelsey’s secure audit logging protocol with tamper resistant hardware, namely iButton. Fur-
thermore, OpenStack leverages Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) to establish a chain of
trust from the embedded TPM chips in the host hardware to critical software components using a




In this thesis, we have proposed a novel and scalable runtime approach to the veriﬁcation of
cloud-wide, VM-level network isolation in large clouds. We presented a new hierarchical model
representing virtual networks, and we designed efﬁcient algorithms and data structures to support
incremental and parallel veriﬁcation. As a proof of concept, we integrated our approach into Open-
Stack and also extended it to a parallel implementation using Apache Ignite. The experiments
conducted locally and on Amazon EC2 clearly demonstrated the efﬁciency and scalability of our
solution. For a large data center comprising 25,246 VMs, veriﬁcation using our approach ﬁnished
in 13 seconds.
Limitations and Future Works.. The main limitations are as follows. First, since TenantGuard
only focuses on the virtual network layer, a future direction is to integrate it with existing tools
working at other layers (e.g., veriﬁcation tools for physical networks, or co-residency and covert
channel detection techniques). Second, since TenantGuard relies on cloud infrastructures for input
data, how to ensure the integrity of such data (e.g., through trusted computing techniques) is another
future direction. Third, TenantGuard assumes the veriﬁcation results can be safely disclosed to ten-
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